To Be and Not To Be

Since the mid-1970s, there has been a revival of interest in the philosophy of Alexius Meinong and an attendant flurry of Meinong-inspired theories.' One of the pioneering efforts was Terence Parsons's 1974 article, "A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics" (Parsons, 1974), which was followed by a series of articles in which he extended and elaborated his theory, culminating in his 1980 book, Nonexistent Objects (Parsons, 1980). The present essay is a critical and comparative study of Parsons's seminal and exciting work in this area, concentrating on the informal and formal versions of his theory as presented in his book.2 I begin with a discussion of the nature of intentional objects, their properties, and modes of predication as presented in Parsons's informal version of his theory. I argue that his view of objects does not adequately reflect our ordinary ways of speaking and thinking, and I defend Meinongian theories that recognize two modes of predication against Parsons's objections, which are based on his preference for two kinds of properties. I then consider Parsons's application of his theory to fictional objects, pointing out problems with his view that can be avoided by maintaining (contra Parsons) that no existing entities ever appear in works of fiction. I conclude with an outline of one of Parsons's formal versions of his theory, raising some questions and pointing out some difficulties and a curious consequence about modes of predication.