论文信息 - Optimal dynamic mechanism design via a virtual VCG mechanism

Optimal dynamic mechanism design via a virtual VCG mechanism

We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing mechanisms for dynamic settings. We propose a simple optimal mechanism for rather general "separable" settings. The proposed mechanism is implemented via an affine transformation of a dynamic VCG mechanism.

Sham M. Kakade | Ilan Lobel | Hamid Nazerzadeh

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