TRACKS: Musings on Post-Enron Reforms
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In the aftermath of one of the worst financial and accounting scandals, the SEC and other regulatory bodies have initiated a flurry of reforms designed to improve corporate governance and to hopefully deter future abuses. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) has imposed harsher penalties on errant directors and officers and significantly enhanced the role and responsibility of audit committees and independent directors. But the suggested reforms so far have failed to address the major problem that still besets corporate America today. Namely, the agency costs of managing corporations: CEOs, CFOs, and other directors and officers serve their entrenched—insular interest to the detriment of shareholders. In this article, we intend to survey the landscape of the recent suggested reforms, especially as they relate to accounting and audit failures, and evaluate their effectiveness in terms of their ability to alleviate the agency cost of conducting business. We will also offer a proposed reform which we believe can be an effective deterrent to financial and auditing failures.
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