Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) applied to a Royal Navy Hawk jet missile simulation exercise

Abstract The Royal Navy uses Hawk jets to simulate sea-skimming missile attacks against vessels as part of their training regulations. To best achieve these goals, pilots of the Hawk are required to fly at approximately 50 feet above sea level to accurately mimic the flight path of a missile. Despite this need the Hawk is not equipped with a radar altimeter and instead relies upon pilot skill to ensure the safe completion of the operation. Incidents whereby the Hawk jets have struck the water are however recorded, risking pilot safety. This paper explores the Hawk missile simulation task using a Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) and its corresponding hazard analysis Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) methodology to map the key stakeholders within this operation. In doing so, the method explores areas of potential risk in the system and recommends how overall systemic safety of the operation can be improved.

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