Remote Control of Smart Meters: Friend or Foe?

The traditional electrical grid is transitioning into the smart grid. New equipment is being installed to simplify the process of monitoring and managing the grid, making the system more transparent to use but also introducing new security problems. Smart meters are replacing the traditional electrical utility meters, offering new functionalities such as remote reading, automatic error reporting, and the possibility for remote shutoff. This last feature is studied in this paper through two scenarios where the effects are outlined, both on a theoretical level and through a simulation. In the first scenario, the frequency property of the grid is the target to possibly cause a blackout. In the second scenario, the voltage is driven out of bounds by the adversary.

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