Calibration of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods with Voting and Tax Liability Data : Provision of Landscape Amenities in Switzerland

Controversy remains over the degree of hypothetical bias in contingent valutation method (CVM) estimates of values for public goods, especially for public goods with significant passive-use values. This paper uses an “indifferent voter” approach to calibrate stated WTP for a proposed public good increase with actual WTP implied by voting and tax liability data. Our data are from a CVM survey and an actual voting decision on propositions to increase public funds for landscape amenities protection in the canton of Zurich, Switzerland.

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