The objective of this chapter is to estimate the performance and the return of professional training in term of integration of the professional training graduates in labour market. Using a micro econometric study based on data of the OFPPT graduates over the period 2000, 2001 and 2002, the estimations are made by considering two models. The first one is a model with fixed effect which is converging and efficient in the context of this study. The second is a model with heterogeneous parameters where we consider the effects of factors of integration that can be scattered and vary from an individual to the other one. The results show that globally the implement of professional training is efficient as far as the rates of employability are very significant. We conclude that the graduates of the professional training are confronted with a double problem. On one hand, the difficulties inherent to the Moroccan labour market which has its own specific logic, and on the other hand, an effect of reputation pertaining to the system of professional training. This effect of reputation spread beyond the general public to reach companies. Also, the public policies of assistant to the employability of graduates from professional training are inefficient, while networks and practices of cooptation are the mean privileged persons to fit easily into the labour market. The role of the State seems crucial at this level to overcome not only against this phenomenon, but also to put the professional training in the heart of the implement of training and educational policy in Morocco. Concerning job training, we highlight that the special training contracts (contrats speciaux de formation) is an efficient measure of public policy. Indeed, job training programs increase the competitiveness and the performances of Moroccan firms. Besides, these effects are even better when the implementation of training by Moroccan firms is part of a real strategy of human resources development. On the contrary, when firms consider the public policy only as a financing opportunity, they are severely sanctioned.
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