Auction Mechanisms for Energy Trading in Multi-Energy Systems

In green cities, one of the most promising energy system designs is the multi-energy system, which is capable of integrating different energy resources to supply stable energy for users. To schedule diverse energy efficiently, the energy trading among different energy entities is a big issue in multi-energy systems. This paper proposes auction mechanisms for energy trading in a smart multi-energy district, in which the district manager sells electricity, natural gas, and heating energy to users and meanwhile trades with outer energy networks. Two auction mechanisms are designed under the day-ahead and real-time markets, respectively. For each auction, energy allocation is optimized by solving a social welfare maximization problem, which is strictly subject to constraints of physical multi-energy system models. It is theoretically proven that both auctions are able to guarantee the properties of economic efficiency, truthfulness, and individual rationality. With these properties, users are incentivized to participate into the auctions with fairness. Finally, real data are adopted to evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanisms. The theoretic analysis of the properties is verified as well.