Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case

ICT and SCADA systems will play an increasingly operationally critical role in the smart grid. Cyber-attacks to these systems have the potential to result in outcomes in the physical domain. For example, power systems equipment could be damaged, reduced power quality could occur - potentially leading to blackouts - and, in extreme cases, result in safety-related incidents. Recently developed cybersecurity risk assessment guidelines for the smart grid reflect this understanding. However, they provide limited input about how these risks should be analysed. In this paper, we present how event trees - an inductive modelling technique - can be used to explore the potential impact of a cyber-attack to information assets in the smart grid. Using event tree analysis, we have examined cyber-attacks in the context of a voltage control use case, indicating how power grid protection measures may influence the outcome of such an attack and its physical impact to a smart grid.

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