Paper Information - Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)

A. Rubinstein

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