Stability Analysis of Financial Contagion Due to Overlapping Portfolios

Common asset holdings are widely believed to have been the primary vector of contagion in the recent financial crisis. We develop a network approach to the amplification of financial contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and leverage, and we show how it can be understood in terms of a generalized branching process. By studying a stylized model we estimate the circumstances under which systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a function of parameters such as leverage, market crowding, diversification, and market impact. Although diversification may be good for individual institutions, it can create dangerous systemic effects, and as a result financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification. Under our model there is a critical threshold for leverage; below it financial networks are always stable, and above it the unstable region grows as leverage increases. The financial system exhibits "robust yet fragile" behavior, with regions of the parameter space where contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs. Our model and methods of analysis can be calibrated to real data and provide simple yet powerful tools for macroprudential stress testing.

[1]  Charles J. Mode,et al.  Multitype branching processes;: Theory and applications , 1971 .

[2]  J. Gleeson,et al.  A Framework for Analyzing Contagion in Banking Networks , 2011, 1110.4312.

[3]  H. Stanley,et al.  Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Propagation , 2012, Scientific Reports.

[4]  Robert M. May,et al.  Size and complexity in model financial systems , 2012, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[5]  Franklin Allen,et al.  Asset Commonality, Debt Maturity and Systemic Risk , 2011 .

[6]  Prasanna Gai,et al.  Contagion in financial networks , 2010, Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences.

[7]  James P. Gleeson,et al.  Systemic Risk in Banking Networks Without Monte Carlo Simulation , 2012 .

[8]  Stefan Thurner,et al.  Leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility , 2009, 0908.1555.

[9]  R. Cont,et al.  RUNNING FOR THE EXIT: DISTRESSED SELLING AND ENDOGENOUS CORRELATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS , 2011 .

[10]  Fabio Caccioli,et al.  Heterogeneity, Correlations and Financial Contagion , 2011, 1109.1213.

[11]  R. May,et al.  Systemic risk: the dynamics of model banking systems , 2010, Journal of The Royal Society Interface.

[12]  R. May,et al.  Systemic risk in banking ecosystems , 2011, Nature.

[13]  J. Bouchaud,et al.  A proposal for impact-adjusted valuation: Critical leverage and execution risk , 2012, 1204.0922.

[14]  David G. Rand,et al.  Individual versus systemic risk and the Regulator's Dilemma , 2011, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[15]  J. Yang,et al.  Network Models and Financial Stability , 2008 .

[16]  F. Galton,et al.  On the Probability of the Extinction of Families , 1875 .

[17]  Rama Cont,et al.  A Langevin approach to stock market fluctuations and crashes , 1998 .

[18]  Duncan J Watts,et al.  A simple model of global cascades on random networks , 2002, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[19]  Jim Gatheral No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact , 2009 .

[20]  Co-Pierre Georg,et al.  The Effect of the Interbank Network Structure on Contagion and Financial Stability , 2010 .

[21]  Prasanna Gai,et al.  Complexity, concentration and contagion , 2011 .

[22]  J. Staum,et al.  Counterparty Contagion in Context: Contributions to Systemic Risk , 2012 .

[23]  Johan Walden,et al.  Diversification disasters , 2010 .

[24]  Rama Cont,et al.  RESILIENCE TO CONTAGION IN FINANCIAL NETWORKS , 2010, 1112.5687.

[25]  J. Farmer Market Force, Ecology, and Evolution , 1998, adap-org/9812005.

[26]  J. Bouchaud,et al.  How Markets Slowly Digest Changes in Supply and Demand , 2008, 0809.0822.