Zero intelligence in economics and finance

This paper reviews the Zero Intelligence (ZI) methodology for investigating markets. This approach models individual traders, operating within a market mechanism, who behave without strategy, in order to determine the impact of the market mechanism and consequently the effect of trader behaviour. The paper considers the major contributions and models within this area from both the economics and finance communities before examining the strengths and weaknesses of this methodology.

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