A Framework for Online Reverse Auction Based on Market Maker Learning with a Risk-Averse Buyer

The online reverse auction is considered as a new e-commerce approach to purchasing and procuring goods and materials in the supply chain. With the rapid and ever-expanding development of information technology as well as the increasing usage of the Internet around the world, the use of an online reverse auction method to provide the required items by organizations has increased. Accordingly, in this paper, a new framework for the online reverse auction process is provided that takes both sides of the procurement process, namely, buyer and seller. The proposed process is a multiattribute semisealed multiround online reverse auction. The main feature of the proposed process is that an online market maker facilitates the seller’s bidding process by the estimation of the buyer’s scoring function. For this purpose, a multilayer perceptron neural network was used to estimate the scoring function. In this case, in addition to hiding the buyer’s scoring function, sellers can improve their bids using the estimated scoring function and a nonlinear multiobjective optimization model. The NSGA II algorithm has been used to solve the seller model. To evaluate the proposed model, the auction process is simulated by considering three scoring functions (additive, multiplicative, and risk-aversion) and two types of open and semisealed auctions. The simulation results show that the efficiency of the proposed model is not significantly different from the open auction, and in addition, unlike the open auction, the buyer information was not disclosed.

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