Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

The Poisson model of games with population uncertainty is extended, by allowing that expected population sizes and players' utility functions may depend on an unknown state of the world. Such extended Poisson games are applied to prove a generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem.

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