Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

Abstract. The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided.

[1]  A. Sen,et al.  Utilitarianism and Welfarism , 1979 .

[2]  F. Bourguignon,et al.  Family size and social utility: income distribution dominance criteria. , 1989, Journal of econometrics.

[3]  W. Gaertner.  Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory , 2001 .

[4]  Peter J. Hammond,et al.  Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice , 1976 .

[5]  Taradas Bandyopadhyay.  Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence , 1988 .

[6]  A. Sen,et al.  Commodities and Capabilities , 1987 .

[7]  Ronald Dworkin,et al.  What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources , 1981 .

[8]  A. Sen,et al.  Choice Functions and Revealed Preference , 1971 .

[9]  Walter Bossert,et al.  Ranking Opportunity Sets: A n Ax-iomatic Approach , 1994 .

[10]  Brian Barry,et al.  Theories of Justice , 1992 .

[11]  A. Sen,et al.  Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics? , 1979 .

[12]  Yakar Kannai,et al.  Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions , 1977 .

[13]  A. Sen,et al.  The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal , 1970, Journal of Political Economy.

[14]  Alain Trannoy,et al.  Individual Freedom of Choice in a Social Setting , 1996 .

[15]  C. John,et al.  Utilitarianism and beyond: Morality and the theory of rational behaviour , 1982 .

[16]  P. Hammond,et al.  Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments , 1997 .

[17]  T. Suzuki,et al.  Standard of Living , 1969 .

[18]  John A. Weymark,et al.  Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction , 1984 .

[19]  D. Primont,et al.  Duality, Separability, and Functional Structure: Theory and Economic Applications , 1978 .

[20]  A. Michalos.  Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations , 1982 .

[21]  Nicolas Gravel,et al.  Can a Ranking of Opportunity Sets Attach an Intrinsic Importance to Freedom of Choice , 1994 .

[22]  R. M. Hare,et al.  Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. , 1982 .

[23]  A. Sen,et al.  Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content , 2022 .

[24]  Jean-Jacques Laffont,et al.  Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics: An Introduction to Kantian Economics , 1975 .

[25]  James Redekop,et al.  Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains , 1991 .

[26]  C. Puppe.  An Axiomatic Approach to “Preference for Freedom of Choice” , 1996 .

[27]  H. Varian.  The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis , 1982 .

[28]  Amartya Sen,et al.  Welfare, Freedom and Social Choice: a Reply , 1990, Recherches économiques de Louvain.

[29]  Marc Fleurbaey,et al.  EQUALITY AMONG RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS , 2002 .

[30]  G. Debreu.  Mathematical Economics: Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function , 1983 .

[31]  W. Diewert.  Hick's Aggregation Theorem and the Existence of a Real Value Added Function , 1978 .

[32]  Richard J. Arneson.  Equality and equal opportunity for welfare , 1989 .

[33]  A. Sen,et al.  Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms , 1993 .

[34]  Charles Blackorby,et al.  Money metric utility: A harmless normalization? , 1988 .

[35]  Walter Diewert,et al.  Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation: A comparison of alternative approaches , 1983 .

[36]  Angus Deaton,et al.  Measurement of welfare : theory and practical guidelines , 1980 .

[37]  J. Roemer,et al.  Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation , 1987 .

[38]  Andrew Caplin,et al.  Aggregation and Social Choice , 1991 .

[39]  G. Cohen,et al.  On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice , 1989, Ethics.

[40]  P. Samuelson.  Complementarity-An Essay on the 40th Anniversary of the Hicks-Allen Revolution in Demand Theory , 1974 .

[41]  A. Sen.  Non-Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Reply to Professor Harsanyi , 1977 .

[42]  Mordecai Avriel,et al.  r-convex functions , 1972, Math. Program..

[43]  T. K. Abbott,et al.  Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, Tr. By T.K. Abbott , 1895 .

[44]  John E. Roemer,et al.  A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner , 1992 .

[45]  H. Houthakker.  Revealed Preference and the Utility Function , 1950 .

[46]  H. Varian.  The Nonparametric Approach to Production Analysis , 1984 .

[47]  B. Postow.  Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point , 1986 .

[48]  Udo Ebert,et al.  Sequential Generalized Lorenz Dominance and Transfer Principles , 2000 .

[49]  Clemens Puppe,et al.  Freedom of choice and rational decisions , 1995 .

[50]  M. Richter.  Revealed Preference Theory , 1966 .

[51]  Claude d'Aspremont,et al.  Axioms for social welfare orderings. In Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein (eds.), Social Goals and Social Organization , 1985 .

[52]  Marc Fleurbaey,et al.  Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem , 1995 .

[53]  A. Atkinson,et al.  The Comparison of Multi-Dimensioned Distributions of Economic Status , 1982 .

[54]  Udo Edbert,et al.  Social Welfare when Needs Differ: An Axiomatic Approach , 1997 .

[55]  Claude d'Aspremont,et al.  Utility theory and ethics , 1996 .

[56]  P. Samuelson.  Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference , 1948 .

[57]  Marc Fleurbaey,et al.  On fair compensation , 1994 .

[58]  Patrick Suppes,et al.  Maximizing Freedom of Decision: an Axiomatic Analysis , 1987 .

[59]  K. Koch,et al.  Revealed preference theory and mean demand , 1987 .

[60]  P. Pattanaik,et al.  On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice , 1990, Recherches économiques de Louvain.

[61]  Walter Bossert,et al.  Redistribution and compensation , 1996 .

[62]  R. M. Hare.  Utilitarianism and beyond: Ethical theory and utilitarianism , 1982 .

[63]  Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert,et al.  Freedom of choice , 1971, The Review of Politics.

[64]  N. Gravel.  Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty , 1998 .

[65]  C. d'Aspremont,et al.  Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice , 1977 .

[66]  Walter Bossert,et al.  Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics , 1995 .

[67]  James Griffin,et al.  Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance. , 1987 .

[68]  A. Sen,et al.  Collective Choice and Social Welfare , 2017 .