Handling Payoff Uncertainty in Green Security Domains with Adversary Bounded Rationality

Research on Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) has recently shifted to green security domains, for example, protecting wildlife from illegal poaching. Previous research on this topic has advocated the use of behavioral (bounded rationality) models of adversaries in SSG. As its first contribution, this paper, for the first time, provides validation of these behavioral models based on real-world data from a wildlife park. The paper’s next contribution is the first algorithm to handle payoff uncertainty – an important concern in green security domains – in the presence of such adversarial behavioral models.

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