Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera

In response to historical challenges, advocates of a sophisticated variant of scientific realism emphasize that theoretical systems can be divided into numerous constituents. Setting aside any epistemic commitment to the systems themselves, they maintain that we can justifiably believe those specific constituents that are deployed in key successful predictions. Stathis Psillos articulates an explicit criterion for discerning exactly which theoretical constituents qualify. I critique Psillos's criterion in detail. I then test the more general deployment realist intuition against a set of well-known historical cases, whose significance has, I contend, been overlooked. I conclude that this sophisticated form of realism remains threatened by the historical argument that prompted it. 1. A criterion for scientific realism2. Assessing the criterion3. A return to the crucial insight: responsibility4. A few case studies5. Assessing deployment realism A criterion for scientific realism Assessing the criterion A return to the crucial insight: responsibility A few case studies Assessing deployment realism

[1]  K. Hutchison Miracle or Mystery? Hypotheses and Predictions in Rankine’s Thermodynamics , 2002 .

[2]  L. Laudan A Confutation of Convergent Realism , 1981, Philosophy of Science.

[3]  Timothy D. Lyons The Epistemological and axiological tenets of scientific realism , 2001 .

[4]  P. Kitcher The Advancement of Science , 1993 .

[5]  B. Stephenson Epitome of Copernican Astronomy , 1987 .

[6]  Howard Sankey,et al.  Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence , 2004 .

[7]  Jarrett Leplin,et al.  A novel defense of scientific realism , 1997 .

[8]  Maurice A. Finocchiaro,et al.  The Discovery of Kepler's Laws: The Interaction of Science, Philosophy, and Religion , 1994 .

[9]  T. Lyons,et al.  Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory , 2003, Philosophy of Science.

[10]  T. Kuhn,et al.  The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought , 1958 .

[11]  J. Worrall Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?* , 1989 .

[12]  P. Kyle Stanford,et al.  No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science , 2003, Philosophy of Science.

[13]  S. Psillos Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth , 1999 .

[14]  T. Lyons,et al.  Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens , 2002 .

[15]  Curtis Wilson,et al.  Force and Geometry in Newton's "Principia" , 1995 .

[16]  J. Bruce Brackenridge,et al.  'The Key to Newton's Dynamics: The Kepler Problem and the'Principia'. Containing an English Translation of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Book One from the First (1687) Edition of Newton's' Mathematical , 1995 .

[17]  John Worrall,et al.  How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the "Luminiferous Ether" , 1994, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

[18]  Stathis Psilos Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds , 2005 .

[19]  Ilkka Niiniluoto,et al.  Critical Scientific Realism , 1999 .

[20]  Hasok Chang,et al.  Preservative Realism and Its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric , 2003, Philosophy of Science.