A Core Broking Model for E-Markets

Coalitions, which allow traders to form teams, can sometimes accomplish tasks more efficiently than individuals. The core has become a popular solution concept in economic applications for researchers in Computer Science, because it provides a way to find stable sets. However, its problems hinder researchers from applying it to a real world market. This paper proposes a new Core Broking Model (CBM), which is based on the core and adopts some other solution concepts to resolve group trading problems in emarkets. It involves bundle selling of composite services from several service providers, offering amount discounts in group buying in the e-marketplace. The CBM successfully creates a win-win-win situation for customers, providers and brokers in e-markets. The comparison between the results of the new model and the core shows that the CBM is superior to the core when applied in e-markets. The results of the simulation presented in this paper demonstrate that the CBM can attract customers and deal with online group trading problems in a large coalition. An extensive evaluation of the CBM has been made and shows that it is effective and efficient.

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