The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power

In an election, voting power—the probability that a single vote is decisive—is affected by the rule for aggregating votes into a single outcome. Voting power is important for studying political representation, fairness and strategy, and has been much discussed in political science. Although power indexes are often considered as mathematical definitions, they ultimately depend on statistical models of voting. Mathematical calculations of voting power usually have been performed under the model that votes are decided by coin flips. This simple model has interesting implications for weighted elections, two-stage elections (such as the U.S. Electoral College) and coalition structures. We discuss empirical failings of the coin-flip model of voting and consider, first, the implications for voting power and, second, ways in which votes could be modeled more realistically. Under the random voting model, the standard deviation of the average of n votes is proportional to 1/√n, but under more general models, this variance can have the form cn^(−α) or √a−b log n. Voting power calculations undermore realistic models present research challenges in modeling and computation.

[1]  L. Penrose The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting , 1946 .

[2]  Martin Shubik,et al.  A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System , 1954, American Political Science Review.

[3]  P. Whittle,et al.  ON THE VARIATION OF YIELD VARIANCE WITH PLOT SIZE , 1956 .

[4]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games And Decisions , 1958 .

[5]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. , 1958 .

[6]  H. Raiffa,et al.  Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. , 1958 .

[7]  M. Shubik,et al.  Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior. , 1965 .

[8]  W. Riker,et al.  A Theory of the Calculus of Voting , 1968, American Political Science Review.

[9]  Banzhaf,et al.  One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College , 1968 .

[10]  Steven J. Brams,et al.  The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning , 1974, American Political Science Review.

[11]  John Ferejohn,et al.  The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis , 1974, American Political Science Review.

[12]  Guillermo Owen,et al.  Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game , 1975, American Political Science Review.

[13]  Nathaniel N. Beck A note on the probability of a tied election , 1975 .

[14]  Rejoinder to “Comment” by S. J. Brams and M. D. Davis , 1975 .

[15]  I. J. Good,et al.  Estimating the efficacy of a vote , 1975 .

[16]  T. Levesque,et al.  Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College , 1975, American Political Science Review.

[17]  Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College” , 1975 .

[18]  H. Margolis Probability of a tie election , 1977 .

[19]  IIIl Samuel Merrill Citizen Voting Power Under the Electoral College: A Stochastic Model Based on State Voting Patterns , 1978 .

[20]  W. Cleveland Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots , 1979 .

[21]  Gary Chamberlain,et al.  A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote , 1981 .

[22]  H. Margolis The Banzhaf Fallacy , 1983 .

[23]  Stuart Elaine Macdonald,et al.  The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[24]  L. Shapley A Value for n-person Games , 1988 .

[25]  Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory , 1989 .

[26]  C. J. Uhlaner,et al.  Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups , 1989 .

[27]  Benjamin I. Page,et al.  The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences , 1992 .

[28]  J. Lichtenberg,et al.  Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory. , 1992 .

[29]  A. Rapoport,et al.  An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference? , 1993, British Journal of Political Science.

[30]  Norman R. Luttbeg The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences . By Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Pp. 489. $59.95 hard, $19.95 paper.) , 1993 .

[31]  John H. Aldrich Rational Choice and Turnout , 1993 .

[32]  Gary King,et al.  A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans , 1994 .

[33]  J. Ruiz,et al.  On the purity of the limiting gibbs state for the Ising model on the Bethe lattice , 1995 .

[34]  G. Kalai,et al.  Every monotone graph property has a sharp threshold , 1996 .

[35]  A. Natapoff A mathematical one-man one-vote rationale for Madisonian presidential voting based on maximum individual voting power , 1996 .

[36]  K. T. Poole,et al.  Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting , 1997 .

[37]  Dan S. Felsenthal,et al.  The measurement of voting power , 1998 .

[38]  Gary King,et al.  Estimating the Probability of Events that Have Never Occured: When is Your Vote Decisive? , 1998 .

[39]  T. Swartz,et al.  Extended voting measures , 1999 .

[40]  George Tsebelis,et al.  Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union? , 1999 .

[41]  D. Leech An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices , 2002 .

[42]  Y. Peres,et al.  Broadcasting on trees and the Ising model , 2000 .

[43]  D. Felsenthal,et al.  Enlargement of the EU and weighted voting in its council of ministers , 2000 .

[44]  Donald G. Saari,et al.  Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[45]  Jonathan N. Katz,et al.  Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College , 2002 .

[46]  M E J Newman,et al.  Identity and Search in Social Networks , 2002, Science.

[47]  A. Gelman Voting, Fairness, and Political Representation , 2002 .

[48]  David Strömberg,et al.  Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida , 2002 .

[49]  Edward J. McCaffery,et al.  Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of American Election Reform , 2003 .

[50]  Larry M. Bartels,et al.  Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable ? , 2004 .

[51]  Andrew Gelman,et al.  Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis , 2002, British Journal of Political Science.