论文信息 - JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS # 2007 – 010 Parametric Contest Success Functions

JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS # 2007 – 010 Parametric Contest Success Functions

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of parameters, where each parameter is specific to one of the contestants. In the second, the winning probabilities depend on investments and a scalar parameter common to all contestants.

R. Sarin | Birendra Rai

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