The Game of the Name in Cryptographic Tables

We present a name-passing calculus that can be regarded as a simplified π-calculus equipped with a cryptographic table. The latter is a data structure representing the relationships among names. We illustrate how the calculus may be used for modelling cryptographic protocols relying on symmetric shared keys and verifying secrecy and authenticity properties. Following classical approaches [3], we formulate the verification task as a reachability problem and prove its decidability assuming finite principals and bounds on the sorts of the messages synthesized by the attacker.

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