A New Framework

This document presents a new framework for the the study of the political economy of the budget process building on the very profuse available literature on budget processes, fiscal policy, and institutions in Latin America. It adds emphasis to the role of actors, the role of the budget process as facilitator of exchanges in the policymaking process, the differences between formal rules and actual practices, and other relevant budgetary outcomes beyond sustainability.

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