A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
暂无分享,去创建一个
Condorcet’s principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda’s rule but by any scoring method; nevertheless the essential property of scoring functions—“consistency” of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups—is shown to be compatible with Condorcet’s principle. Moreover these two properties, suitably interpreted, together with neutrality, determine a unique rule known as Kemeny’s rule.
[1] L. A. Goodman,et al. Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .
[2] D. Black. The theory of committees and elections , 1959 .
[3] Michel Balinski,et al. On the graph structure of convex polyhedra in n-space , 1961 .
[4] P. Gilmore,et al. A Characterization of Comparability Graphs and of Interval Graphs , 1964, Canadian Journal of Mathematics.
[5] P. Fishburn. The Theory Of Social Choice , 1973 .