State‐of‐the‐art research on electromagnetic information security

As information security is becoming increasingly significant, security at the hardware level is as important as in networks and applications. In recent years, instrumentation has become cheaper and more precise, computation has become faster, and capacities have increased. With these advancements, the threat of advanced attacks that were considerably difficult to carry out previously has increased not only in military and diplomatic fields but also in general-purpose manufactured devices. This paper focuses on the problem of the security limitations concerning electromagnetic waves (electromagnetic information security) that has rendered attack detection particularly difficult at the hardware level. In addition to reviewing the mechanisms of these information leaks and countermeasures, this paper also presents the latest research trends and standards.

[1]  H. Sekiguchi,et al.  Estimation of receivable distance for radiated disturbance containing information signal from information technology equipment , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility.

[2]  M. G. Kuhn,et al.  Compromising emanations of LCD TV sets , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility.

[3]  Yu-ichi Hayashi,et al.  A Threat for Tablet PCs in Public Space: Remote Visualization of Screen Images Using EM Emanation , 2014, CCS.

[4]  Markus G. Kuhn,et al.  Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations , 1998, Information Hiding.

[5]  Dakshi Agrawal,et al.  The EM Side-Channel(s) , 2002, CHES.

[6]  Takashi Watanabe,et al.  Countermeasure for electromagnetic screen image leakage based on color mixing in human brain , 2010, 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility.

[7]  Martin Vuagnoux,et al.  An improved technique to discover compromising electromagnetic emanations , 2010, 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility.

[8]  Y. Yamanaka,et al.  Feasibility study for reconstruction of information from near field observations of the magnetic field of laser printer , 2006, 2006 17th International Zurich Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility.

[9]  Adi Shamir,et al.  A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems , 1978, CACM.

[10]  Milos Prvulovic,et al.  Experimental Demonstration of Electromagnetic Information Leakage From Modern Processor-Memory Systems , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility.