Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions
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S. Matthew Weinberg | Matheus V. X. Ferreira | Meryem Essaidi | S. Weinberg | Matheus V. X. Ferreira | Meryem Essaidi
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