A dynamic output integration mechanism for LQG power networks with random type parameters

We consider a dynamic game model of power networks with generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called the utility; a game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides a private control to minimize its own cost functional, and the utility manages information transmissions between the utility and agents and decides command signals, called prices, to minimize a public cost functional. In this problem setting, we propose a dynamic output integration mechanism for LQG power networks. The LQG power networks is a generic linear Gaussian model of power networks, which is motivated by so-called average system frequency models. In each model of the agents, we include the type parameter presenting each agent's private information. Also, we consider the estimation in calculation of prices by the utility. The proposed mechanism satisfies the public optimality of the optimal private controls, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality, in both fixed horizon and receding horizon cases.