China's Drive to Close the Technological Gap: S&T Reform and the Imperative to Catch Up

It would appear that many western observers of China, with some recent notable exceptions, have systematically underestimated the importance attached to S&T (science and technology) development by both the Maoist and post-Mao leadership.1 This article will argue that it is difficult to understand the complexities of Chinese affairs since 1949 within the political, economic and military spheres without direct reference to China's research and development (R&D) and education systems.2 Since the 1 950s, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proclaimed "the love of science" to be a national virtue, China's persistent struggle to achieve rapid and sustained economic growth has been made conspicuous by the critical role attached to the modernization of science and technology.3 From the perspective of existing western theories of development it may not seem surprising to find among China's leaders a recognition of the importance of science and technology for enhancing productivity and improving social welfare.4 What is somewhat surprising, however, is the extent to which the drive to enhance Chinese scientific and technological capabilities has so often predominated in the policy-making process.5 In spite of periodic differences between various leadership factions regarding an appropriate S&T development strategy for China, it has, nevertheless, been viewed as a means to catapult the country ahead both economically and militarily. There is little doubt, for example, that co-operation with the Soviet Union in the 1950s was seen as instrumental in helping to close the prevailing gap between China and the rest of the world. Of course, it can be argued that few achievements by China's S&T