Pay-To-Win: Incentive Attacks on Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies
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Edgar R. Weippl | Sarah Meiklejohn | Aljosha Judmayer | Alexei Zamyatin | Nicholas Stifter | Ittay Eyal | Peter Gazi | Itay Tsabary | Ittay Eyal | S. Meiklejohn | Itay Tsabary | Aljosha Judmayer | Nicholas Stifter | Alexei Zamyatin | Peter Gazi | E. Weippl
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