论文信息 - A formal analysis of Syverson's rational exchange protocol

A formal analysis of Syverson's rational exchange protocol

In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. A rational exchange protocol guarantees that misbehavior cannot generate benefits, and is therefore discouraged. The analysis is performed using our formal model, which is based on game theory. In this model, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium.

[1] Markus Jakobsson,et al. Ripping Coins For a Fair Exchange , 1995, EUROCRYPT.

[2] Paul F. Syverson,et al. Weakly secret bit commitment: applications to lotteries and fair exchange , 1998, Proceedings. 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (Cat. No.98TB100238).

[3] Seif Haridi,et al. Distributed Algorithms , 1992, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[4] Levente Buttyán,et al. Rational Exchange - A Formal Model Based on Game Theory , 2001, WELCOM.

[5] Levente Buttyán,et al. Removing the financial incentive to cheat in micropayment schemes , 2000 .

[6] Levente Buttyán. Building blocks for secure services , 2002 .

[7] Levente Buttyán,et al. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR SECURE SERVICES: AUTHENTICATED KEY TRANSPORT AND RATIONAL EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS , 2002 .

[8] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions , 1997, IEEE Internet Comput..

[9] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[10] J.-Y. Le Boudec,et al. Toward self-organized mobile ad hoc networks: the terminodes project , 2001, IEEE Commun. Mag..