Working-Class Power , Capitalist-Class Interests , and Class Compromise 1

This article proposes a general theoretical framework for understanding the concept of "class compromise" in terms of a "reverse-J" model of the relationship between the associational power of workers and the interests of capitalists: increases in working-class power adversely affect capitalist-class interests until such power crosses some intermediate threshold beyond which further increases in working-class power are potentially beneficial to capitalists' interests. This article argues that the reverse-J curve is itself the result of two distinct kinds of effects of workers' power on capitalists' interests: one, a negative effect, in which workers' power undermines the capacity of capitalists to unilaterally make various kinds of decisions, and the second, a positive effect, in which workers' power helps capitalists solve the various kinds of collective action problems they face.

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