论文信息 - Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices

Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices

Abstract In this paper, we provide a new characterization of the Deegan–Packel power index, which uses a new monotonicity property, and two characterizations of the Johnston power index by employing some usual properties of the literature and two new transfer properties. Finally, a real-world numerical example taken from the political field illustrates the main differences between these two indices.

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