The Administrative Role of the Chief Justice: Law, Politics, and Procedure in the Roberts Court Era

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court plays a critical role in shaping national politics and public policy. While political scientists tend to focus on the ways in which the chief affects the Court’s jurisprudence, relatively little attention has been devoted to the unique administrative aspects of the position that allow for strategic influence over political and legal outcomes. This article examines the role of the chief justice as the head of the Judicial Conference, which is the primary policy making body for federal courts in the United States. Specifically, I examine the degree to which Chief Justice Roberts has appointed members to the Conference’s rulemaking committees with a long-standing conservative legal goal in mind: constricting access to courts. By focusing on the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in particular, I show that Chief Justice Roberts’ sole discretion to appoint members to these committees constitutes a “purely procedural” role through which he has exercised extensive political power, blurring the line between “law” and “politics” to great effect.

[1]  Artemus Ward,et al.  The Chief Justice: Appointment and Influence , 2016 .

[2]  Ian J. Samuel The Counter-Clerks of Justice Scalia , 2016 .

[3]  J. Ura,et al.  Experience counts: The chief justice, management tenure, and strategic behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court , 2016 .

[4]  J. Ura,et al.  The Chief Justice, Experience, and Strategic Behavior on the Supreme Court , 2016 .

[5]  Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees , 2015 .

[6]  Steven S. Gensler The 2015 amendments to the federal rules of civil procedure , 2015 .

[7]  Stephen B. Burbank,et al.  Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach , 2015 .

[8]  Sarah Staszak No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial Retrenchment , 2014 .

[9]  Thomas O. Main,et al.  The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure , 2014 .

[10]  Dawn M. Chutkow The Chief Justice as Executive , 2014, Journal of Law and Courts.

[11]  Stephen B. Burbank,et al.  Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach , 2014 .

[12]  M. Popova Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development. By Justin Crowe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. 328p. $80.00 cloth, $35.00 paper. , 2013, Perspectives on Politics.

[13]  Andrew D. Martin,et al.  The Judicial Common Space , 2007 .

[14]  J. Crowe The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft , 2007, The Journal of Politics.

[15]  Marc Galanter,et al.  The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts , 2004 .

[16]  Virginia A. Hettinger,et al.  Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas , 2001 .

[17]  Daniel Carpenter,et al.  The forging of bureaucratic autonomy : reputations, networks, and policy innovation in executive agencies, 1862-1928 , 2001 .

[18]  J. Stempel Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope , 2001 .

[19]  J. Resnik The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts and Altered Aspirations , 1999 .

[20]  M. Galanter,et al.  Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change , 1974, Discussions in Dispute Resolution.

[21]  P. Fish The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration , 1973 .