With Great Complexity Comes Great Vulnerability: From Stand-Alone Fixes to Reconfigurable Security

The increasing complexity of modern computing devices has rendered security architectures vulnerable to recent side-channel and transient-execution attacks. We discuss the most relevant defenses as well as their drawbacks and how to overcome them for next-generation secure processor design.

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