Power system resilience through defender-attacker-defender models with uncertainty: an overview

Making a power system more operationally resilient to disruption is an important and hard problem. Modeling decisions must include careful consideration of the interaction between system defenders and potential disruptors, the complex operational nature of the system, and the availability and uncertainty of information. Multi-level optimization defender-attacker-defender models are a suitable choice here since they can express such considerations, quantify resilience, and output prescriptive decisions for reaching resilience. In this paper, we review such models employed by power systems applications, with the aim of demonstrating accessibility and applicability of various formulations. In particular, we highlight modeling choices and assumptions, algorithmic details, and where uncertainty is captured or can be injected within a model.

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