Competitive spatial models

Abstract A large number of decision situations can be modeled as spatial problems. Whereas the usual location models allow only one firm or facility to locate, competitive models permit the other facilities to react to their competitors' actions. One question is then not only where an individual facility will locate but if repeated relocation of the facilities involved does converge towardsa predictable pattern. Many competitive spatial models have been described in the literature. In this review we first formalize the general model and delineate its components. Then we survey some of the major results and put them into perspective. We conclude the review with a number of research ideas which may be explored in the future.

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