Chapter 23. Overcoming Decision Biases to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes
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Howard Kunreuther | Robert J. Meyer | Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan | H. Kunreuther | R. Meyer | E. Michel-Kerjan
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