Managers and (Secret) Social Networks: The Influence of the Freemasonry on Firm Performance

In this paper, I study the impact of managers’ affiliations with the Freemasonry on the performances of companies. Using a unique data set of 412 companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange between 1895 and 1902, I find that young and small firms run by Masonic managers exhibited larger leverage ratios. These companies earned higher profits, although the effect is not statistically significant. Large publicly quoted corporations managed by Freemasons instead had lower profits and lower Tobin’s Q. I discuss the issue of the endogeneity of Freemasonry membership, and I use four different approaches to partially address this.

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