Bargaining and Bargaining Sets

Abstract We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that exactly implements the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism corresponds closely to the description of the bargaining set and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D51.

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