A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs

In response to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Mumbai police have started to schedule a limited number of inspection checkpoints on the road network throughout the city. Algorithms for similar security-related scheduling problems have been proposed in recent literature, but security scheduling in networked domains when targets have varying importance remains an open problem at large. In this paper, we cast the network security problem as an attacker-defender zero-sum game. The strategy spaces for both players are exponentially large, so this requires the development of novel, scalable techniques. We first show that existing algorithms for approximate solutions can be arbitrarily bad in general settings. We present Rugged (Randomization in Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and Defender), the first scalable optimal solution technique for such network security games. Our technique is based on a double oracle approach and thus does not require the enumeration of the entire strategy space for either of the players. It scales up to realistic problem sizes, as is shown by our evaluation of maps of southern Mumbai obtained from GIS data.

[1]  G. G. Stokes "J." , 1890, The New Yale Book of Quotations.

[2]  J. Neumann Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele , 1928 .

[3]  M. M. Flood THE HIDE AND SEEK GAME OF VON NEUMANN , 1972 .

[4]  William H. Ruckle,et al.  Ambushing Random Walks I: Finite Models , 1976, Oper. Res..

[5]  P. Hudson Search Games , 1982 .

[6]  S. Alpern Infiltration games on arbitrary graphs , 1992 .

[7]  Alan Washburn,et al.  Two-Person Zero-Sum Games for Network Interdiction , 1995, Oper. Res..

[8]  Micah Adler,et al.  Randomized Pursuit-Evasion in Graphs , 2002, Combinatorics, Probability and Computing.

[9]  Avrim Blum,et al.  Planning in the Presence of Cost Functions Controlled by an Adversary , 2003, ICML.

[10]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security , 2009, AI Mag..

[11]  Nicola Basilico,et al.  Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies , 2009, AAMAS.

[12]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games , 2009, IJCAI.

[13]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness , 2010, AAMAS.

[14]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  A graph-theoretic approach to protect static and moving targets from adversaries , 2010, AAMAS.

[15]  Ely Porat,et al.  Path disruption games , 2010, AAMAS.

[16]  Milind Tambe,et al.  Urban security: game-theoretic resource allocation in networked physical domains , 2010, AAAI 2010.

[17]  Branislav Bosanský,et al.  Transiting areas patrolled by a mobile adversary , 2010, Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games.

[18]  Manish Jain,et al.  Security Games with Arbitrary Schedules: A Branch and Price Approach , 2010, AAAI.

[19]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness , 2010, AAMAS 2010.