Some Political Constraints on a Political Science: Quantitative Content Analysis and the Indo-Chinese Border Crisis of 1962

Kuang-sheng Liao and Allen Whiting's study of " Chinese press perceptions of threat: the U.S. and India, 1962 "* is " a case study in crisis communication " (page 96). In fact it is far and away the best representative of that genre in the field of China studies and therefore worthy of careful attention as an instance of an ever more popular approach. Despite its high quality, however, there is no way in which a mechanical methodology, aimed at discovering duplicative patterns which offer valid, objective measurements, can comprehend human actions which are contingent, open and reflexive; actions, that is, in which people are only partially aware of their own motives and in which they continually clash, learn and change. Since the border war between China and India in 1962 came as a surprise to Nehru (page 83), Liao and Whiting's point is to find clues in the Chinese press to the perceptions that led the Chinese leadership to launch their roll-back of India's forward thrust. A proper monitoring of Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), according to Liao and Whiting, " would have cautioned Indian leaders against assuming that China would not fight . . . " (page 96). Such a method, which might contribute to preventing a government from actions likely to spark off a war, obviously has much to offer. Yet a close study of that methodology shows that even Liao and Whiting know that it cannot achieve this commendable goal.