Promotion of cooperation induced by two-sided players in prisoner's dilemma game

Abstract We examine how real-world individuals and companies can either reach an agreement or fail to reach an agreement after several stages of negotiation. We use a modified prisoner’s dilemma game with two-sided players who can either cooperate or not cooperate with their neighbors. We find that the presence of even a small number of these two-sided players substantially promotes the cooperation because, unlike the rock–paper–scissors scenario, when the cooperators change to the non-cooperators to gain a payoff, they can turn to the two-sided players and continue negotiating. We find that the network structure influences the spread of strategies. Lattice and regular-random (RR) networks benefit the spread of both non-cooperation and two-sided strategies, but scale-free (SF) networks stop both strategies. We also find that the Erdos–R e nyi (ER) network promotes the two-sided strategy and blocks the spread of non-cooperation. As the ER network density decreases, and the network degree is lowered the lifetime of non-cooperators increases. Our results expand our understanding of the role played by the two-sided strategy in the growth of the cooperative behavior in networks.

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