Preventing systemic crises through bank transparency

The banking system is known to be vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises that are caused by depositors' co-ordination failure. We show that transparency regulation may prevent certain types of systemic crisis by eliminating the possibility of coordination failure. Copyright Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, 2004

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