THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPENDENCE OF QUALITY ON PRICE

If the legal rate . . . was fixed so high . . . , the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and profectors, who alone would be willing to give this higher interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of mnoney no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the competition. . . . Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776.

[1]  P. H. Prasad.  Growth with full employment , 1970 .

[2]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  Money, Credit Constraints, and Economic Activity , 1983 .

[3]  Anjan V. Thakor,et al.  Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets , 1987 .

[4]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility and Unemployment , 1987 .

[5]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination , 1973 .

[6]  Costas Azariadis,et al.  Employment With Asymmetric Information , 1983 .

[7]  Gary S. Fields,et al.  Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and underemployment, and job-search activity in LDCs. , 1975, Journal of development economics.

[8]  Neil Wallace,et al.  A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations , 1981 .

[9]  Thomas Russell,et al.  Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing , 1976 .

[10]  Sanford J. Grossman,et al.  Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment , 1981 .

[11]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization: A Study in the Economics of Risk. , 1983 .

[12]  Katharine G. Abraham,et al.  Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The Case of Experience , 1981 .

[13]  G. Calvo.  Quasi-Walrasian Theories of Unemployment , 1979 .

[14]  J. Mill.  Principles of Political Economy , 2011, Forerunners of Realizable Values Accounting in Financial Reporting.

[15]  Costas Azariadis,et al.  Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria , 1983 .

[16]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Reputation and imperfect information , 1982 .

[17]  Joseph Farrell,et al.  Prices as signals of quality , 1981 .

[18]  D. Hamermesh.  Interdependence in the Labour Market , 1975 .

[19]  S. Salop,et al.  A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment , 1979 .

[20]  T. Scitovszky.  Some Consequences of the Habit of Judging Quality by Price , 1944 .

[21]  S. Bowles,et al.  Heart and Minds: A Social Model of U.S. Productivity Growth , 1983 .

[22]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information , 1976 .

[23]  M. Bray.  Futures Trading, Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis , 1981 .

[24]  George A. Akerlof.  Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views , 1984 .

[25]  Helmut Bester,et al.  Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information , 1985 .

[26]  John H. Pencavel,et al.  Wages, Specific Training, and Labor Turnover in US Manufacturing Industries , 1972 .

[27]  H. Allen.  Loans, bequests and taxes where abilities differ : a theoretical analysis using a two-ability model , 1980 .

[28]  W. D. White,et al.  AGENT COMPENSATION AND THE LIMITS OF BONDING , 1982 .

[29]  Geoffrey Heal,et al.  Do Bad Products Drive Out Good , 1976 .

[30]  George A. Akerlof,et al.  Capital, Wages and Structural Unemployment , 1969 .

[31]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation , 1983 .

[32]  G. Rodgers.  Nutritionally Based Wage Determination in the Low-Income Labour Market , 1975 .

[33]  Debraj Ray,et al.  Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment: Policy , 1986 .

[34]  J. Sutton,et al.  Imperfect Capital Markets and the Monetarist Black Box: Liquidity Constraints, Inflation and the Asymmetric Effects of Interest Rate Policy (Now published in Economic Journal, vol. 92, pp.108-128.) , 1982 .

[35]  M. Freimer,et al.  Why Bankers Ration Credit , 1965 .

[36]  A. Klevorick,et al.  Judging quality by price, snob appeal, and the new consumer theory , 1970 .

[37]  S. Salop,et al.  Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market , 1976 .

[38]  Jr. James E. Annable.  A THEORY OF DOWNWARD‐RIGID WAGES AND CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENT , 1977 .

[39]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  The Social Cost of Labor, and Project Evaluation: a General Approach , 1983 .

[40]  Michael Hoel,et al.  Effects on unemployment of reduced working time in an economy where firms set wages , 1986 .

[41]  B. Klein,et al.  The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance , 1981, Journal of Political Economy.

[42]  G. Stigler,et al.  Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers , 1974, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[43]  George A. Akerlof.  The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism , 1970 .

[44]  Samuel Bowles,et al.  The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models , 1985 .

[45]  S. Bhattacharya.  Tournaments, Termination Schemes, and Forcing Contracts , 1985 .

[46]  Charles W. Calomiris,et al.  Price Flexibility, Credit Rationing, and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from the U.S., 1879-1914 , 1985 .

[47]  H. Wette.  Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note , 1983 .

[48]  T. Srinivasan,et al.  Credit and sharecropping in agrarian societies , 1981 .

[49]  E. Schlicht.  Labour Turnover, Wage Structure, and Natural Unemployment , 1978 .

[50]  Jonathan Eaton,et al.  The Pure Theory of Country Risk , 1986 .

[51]  Steven Cheung.  The theory of share tenancy , 1970 .

[52]  Lawrence H. Summers,et al.  A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment , 1986, Journal of Labor Economics.

[53]  B. Greenwald,et al.  Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets , 1986 .

[54]  E. Schlicht.  Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives: A Remark* , 1981 .

[55]  R. Barro.  Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[56]  R. Radner.  Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices , 1979 .

[57]  R. Solow.  Another possible source of wage stickiness , 1979 .

[58]  G. Oster.  Labour Relations and Demand Relations: A Case Study of the 'Unemployment Effect.' , 1980 .

[59]  S. Ross.  The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem , 1973 .

[60]  S. Salop.  Wage differentials in a dynamic theory of the firm , 1973 .

[61]  M. Hellwig.  A Model of Borrowing and Lending with Bankruptcy , 1977 .

[62]  G. Clark.  Productivity Growth without Technical Change in European Agriculture before 1850 , 1987, The Journal of Economic History.

[63]  C. Shapiro,et al.  Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device , 1984 .

[64]  B. Greenwald,et al.  Informational Imperfections and Macro-economic Fluctuations , 1984 .

[65]  Nancy L. Stokey,et al.  A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[66]  G. Debreu,et al.  Theory of Value , 1959 .