The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes

Abstract The purpose of the current paper is to consider the impact of voters' indifference on the likelihood that majority criterion and scoring rules agree in three candidate elections. First, we consider the probability that a given scoring rule and the majority rule agree on a pair of candidates. Secondly, we deal with the probability that the Condorcet winner is bottom ranked by a scoring rule. In both cases, we find out that the likelihood of paradoxes decreases when we allow the voters to report indifference.

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