A dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies

Abstract In the developing economies, optimal forest regimes should incorporate the socio-economic characteristics of the user groups. And, since socio-economic factors will change with time, optimal forest regimes will also follow a dynamic path. The two most important socio-economic factors are the heterogeneity of the user group with respect to forest management and the direct dependence of the user group on forest. Normally, the heterogeneity will increase and dependence will decrease with economic growth of user group. An optimal control model is used to integrate the dynamics of natural system such as joint product of forests and its growth function, and the dynamics of the two socio-economic factors — heterogeneity and dependence. The model demonstrates that the dynamics of optimal forest regimes will depend upon the change in natural factors, socio-economic factors, and on the interactions between natural and socio-economic factors. Hence, optimal forest management strategies would require a continuous refinement in forest management regimes, instead of static state regimes, as local communities in developing economies pass through different phases of economic growth.

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