Attack resilient state estimation for autonomous robotic systems

In this paper we present a methodology to control ground robots under malicious attack on sensors. Within the term attack we intend any malicious disturbance injection on sensors, actuators, and controller that would compromise the safety of a robot. In order to guarantee resilience against attacks, we use a control-level technique implemented within a recursive algorithm that takes advantage of redundancy in the information received by the controller. We use the case study of a vehicle cruise-control, however, the strategy we present in this work is general for several applications. Our methodology relays on redundancy in the sensor measurements: specifically we consider N velocity measurements and use a recursive filtering technique that estimates the state of the system while being resilient against sensor attacks by acting on the variance of the measurements noise. Finally, we move our focus on hardware validation demonstrating our algorithm through extensive outdoor experiments conducted on two unmanned ground robots.

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