论文信息 - An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games

An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games

Abstract An example is developed to show that equilibrium selection via dynamic stability, when applied to the normal form of extensive form games, is inconsistent with the subgame structure. Alternative dynamic approaches are proposed and discussed to circumvent this inconsistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.

Marc Chamberland | Ross Cressman | R. Cressman | M. Chamberland

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