Strombörse und Marktmacht

Seit den späten 80er Jahren gibt es in verschiedenen Ländern Anstrengungen, den Stromsektor zu liberalisieren. Die Hoffnung ist, dass Wettbewerb in der Stromerzeugung die Produktion effizienter und den Strom billiger macht. Sie hat sich jedoch größtenteils nicht erfüllt. Im Gegenteil: In einigen Ländern konnte man in Folge der Liberalisierung stark ansteigende und volatile Preise, zuwenig Investitionen, eine unzuverlässige Stromversorgung bis hin zum völligen Marktkollaps beobachten. Aufgrund der zentralen Bedeutung der Strompreise und Stromversorgung für moderne Volkswirtschaften können derlei Probleme bei Verbrauchern und Wirtschaft große Schäden anrichten. In fast allen Strommärkten wurden daher Anstrengungen unternommen, den Stromsektor zu re-regulieren und die Reformen selbst einem wiederholten Reformprozess zu unterziehen – mit wiederum teilweise enttäuschenden Ergebnissen (Fallstudien finden sich bei Sioshansi und Pfaffenberger [1] oder bei Jamasb und Pollitt [2]).

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