The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare War

The conventional wisdom of national elections suggests that there are electoral costs associated with opposing declarations of war. However, an alternative literature contends that the negative electoral consequences of waging war may be borne by legislators who supported war, especially those members of the majority party. The authors test this assumption by examining the electoral consequences of supporting or opposing the declarations of war for the Mexican-American War, World War I, and the 1991 resolution to use force in the Persian Gulf. The results of their analysis of House elections indicate that although electoral costs were borne for opposing World War I, legislators who dissented often preselected themselves out of Congress through retirement or pursuit of other office. No evidence of electoral costs is evident in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, due in part to the influence of intervening events during the long period between the end of the war and the 1992 election.

[1]  John R. Oneal,et al.  Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion , 1993 .

[2]  James C. Garand,et al.  Changing Meanings of Electoral Marginality in U.S. House Elections, 1824-1978 , 1993 .

[3]  Glenn R. Parker,et al.  Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress: An Economic Interpretation , 1992 .

[4]  T. Clifton Morgan,et al.  Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force , 1992 .

[5]  K. Gaubatz.  Election Cycles and War , 1991 .

[6]  James E. Campbell.  Southern Political Science Association The Presidential Surge and its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections , 1868-1988 , 2007 .

[7]  Richard Stoll.  THE SOUND OF THE GUNS , 1987 .

[8]  T. C. Cotton.  War and American Democracy , 1986 .

[9]  V. O. Key,et al.  Southern Politics In State and Nation , 1984 .

[10]  Richard Stoll.  The Guns of November , 1984 .

[11]  P. J. Conover,et al.  The dynamics of presidential support during international conflict situations: The Iranian hostage crisis , 1981 .

[12]  T. R. Fehrenbach,et al.  Lone Star: A History Of Texas And The Texans , 1980 .

[13]  S. Kernell.  Explaining Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in Measuring One's Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies , 1978, American Political Science Review.

[14]  R. Bartlett,et al.  Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace , 1978 .

[15]  N. Polsby.  The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives , 1968, American Political Science Review.

[16]  Warren E. Miller,et al.  Constituency Influence in Congress , 1963, American Political Science Review.

[17]  G. Jacobson,et al.  The Electoral Origins Of Divided Government , 1990 .

[18]  G. Jacobson,et al.  Strategy and choice in congressional elections , 1981 .

[19]  George C. Edwards.  Presidential influence in Congress , 1980 .

[20]  M. Barone,et al.  The Almanac of American Politics , 1972 .

[21]  N. Polsby.  Congress and the Presidency , 1971 .

[22]  W. Lippmann.  Essays in the public philosophy , 1955 .

[23]  G. Kennan.  American diplomacy, 1900-1950 , 1951 .

[24]  Walter Millis.  Road to war : America, 1914-1917 , 1936 .