Making cooperation valuable: A delay-centric, pricing-based user cooperation strategy

This paper proposes a distributed pricing-based user cooperation strategy for a two-user model focusing on performance from the delay perspective. It explores the fact that cooperation (i.e., one-way relaying as opposed to mutual relaying) is beneficial when users channel conditions are distinct. The strategy only allows valuable cooperation, i.e., the user with a good channel helps relay the packet of a user who suffers from a poor channel. The pricing policy serves as an incentive to encourage the qualified user to engage in cooperation and guarantees that both users have opportunities to benefit from cooperative help. Simulation results show that this strategy has a lower delay, from both the system and the individuals view, than the ‘Non-cooperation’ and ‘Always-cooperation’ strategies.

[1]  Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al.  Data Networks , 1986 .

[2]  Zhu Han,et al.  Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Cooperative Communications , 2008, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.

[3]  Elza Erkip,et al.  User cooperation diversity. Part I. System description , 2003, IEEE Trans. Commun..

[4]  Shalinee Kishore,et al.  A game-theoretic analysis of decode-and-forward user cooperation , 2008, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications.

[5]  Zhu Han,et al.  Distributed Relay Selection and Power Control for Multiuser Cooperative Communication Networks Using Stackelberg Game , 2009, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.

[6]  Gregory W. Wornell,et al.  Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory.